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quality of ratings through regulatory initiatives. In the short term, changes to the
CRAs’ regulatory environment, in a context of high market uncertainty, may add
to market stress.
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1. See, for example,
Nowotny, July 2011: “It is
all apparent from public
statistics and whether
these statistics are
accurate or not, the rating
agencies... do not give any
more intrinsic knowledge,
they simply give opinion.
And these opinions, they
continue to give them in
such a way that it worsens
the crisis”(available at
http://in.reuters.com/article
/2011/07/12/ecb-
nowotny-idINLDE76B1Q32
0110712).
can be considered a lagging indicator that often
show only information that is already known by
the market.
When negative ratings decisions are made, they
are unsurprisingly generally associated with yield
increases (an outlier was the downgrade of the
United States by S&P in early August 2011, which
was associated with a general increase in risk
aversion and lower yields on US bonds because of
their safe-haven status). This effect is confirmed
by recent studies such as those published by the
International Monetary Fund (Arezki, Candelon &
Sy, 2011) or the European Central Bank (Afonso,
Furceri & Gomes, 2011).
However, the extent of this impact is less clear. In
particular, the ECB study notes that negative rat-
ings decisions tend to be preceded by negative
market developments, raising questions about the
direction of causality. Consistent with previous lit-
erature, the ECB paper confirms the existence of
a significant reaction, on the part of both sover-
eign yields and CDS spreads, to rating announce-
ments (this is true in particular for negative
events). The analysis goes a step further since it
assesses if both sovereign yields and CDS spreads
had already absorbed the information contained
in changes to ratings before their announcement.
As regards the anticipation mechanism, the main
result is that the information contained in rating
announcements is not anticipated by the credit
market while the CDS market seems to anticipate
the information contained in ratings downgrades.
The ECB study specifically investigated the issue
of causality between ratings changes and
yields/CDS spread over the short-term and con-
cluded that there is “two-way causality between
sovereign credit ratings and government bond
yield spreads”, namely that “past values of
changes in yield (CDS) spreads are significant
determinants of the change in effective rating and
vice-versa” (Afonso, Furceri & Gomes, 2011).
SOVEREIGN CREDIT RATINGS have been in the
spotlight since the start of the European sovereign
debt crisis, receiving considerable attention from
both the media and the political community. The
European Union has been an active legislator on
ratings with the adoption of the first (November
2009) and second (May 2011) Regulations on
Credit Rating Agencies, and proposals for a third
published by the European Commission in Novem-
ber 2011. The European Parliament has been an
active participant in this process, including the
adoption in March 2011 of a Report on Credit
Rating Agencies (2010/2302(INI)) by its Com-
mittee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON).
This Policy Contribution attempts to clarify key
policy questions related to sovereign credit rat-
ings. It leaves aside broader policy challenges
posed by credit rating agencies which are not
specifically related to the sovereign credit seg-
ment. These have been reviewed in a separate
Bruegel Policy Contribution (Véron, 2011). 
1 THE IMPACT OF SOVEREIGN CREDIT RATINGS
ON THE SOVEREIGN BOND MARKETS
Credit rating agencies have been repeatedly
blamed for causing or exacerbating negative
market developments in the context of the Euro-
pean sovereign debt crisis1. Some recent devel-
opments, in particular Standard & Poor’s (S&P)
erroneous announcement to some of its clients of
a downgrade of France, have added to volatility.
However, the question of the extent to which credit
ratings exacerbate fluctuations in sovereign credit
markets is far from trivial. Consensus on sovereign
bond markets often evolves faster than credit rat-
ings, which tend to typically be ‘behind the curve’.
Negative ratings decisions are often made after
the deterioration of market-based credit indica-
tors. This has been a consistent pattern since the
start of the financial crisis. In that sense, ratings
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Furthermore, this is not a static picture as
investors’ behaviour changes over time. Anecdotal
evidence suggests a gradually reduced depend-
ence on credit ratings since the start of the euro-
area crisis. For example, some large investors
appear to have moved away from reliance on rat-
ings-based sovereign-bond benchmarks indices
to form their own benchmarks. Strikingly, some
negative ratings decisions during the past 18
months have had negligible market impact, sug-
gesting that many commentators’ emphasis on
‘mechanical effects’ does not capture the com-
plexity of linkages. It should be noted, in particular,
that the above-mentioned IMF and ECB analyses
are based on data series stopping in May and
October 2010 respectively, and therefore do not
include observations of the latest 12 months of
the crisis. This is significant as, especially after
the G20 Deauville declaration of 18 October 2010,
market developments appeared to be driven more
by political pronouncements and less by ratings
decisions. The Bank for International Settlements
has concluded that the Deauville declaration had
significant market impact (BIS, 2010). 
2 REDUCING OVER-RELIANCE ON CREDIT
RATINGS
Credit rating agencies derive some of their impor-
tance from the fact that the regulatory system
relies on their assessments. This reliance is
observed in bank regulation, which in some cir-
cumstances sets banks’s capital requirements in
relation to asset risks as assessed by CRAs. Sim-
ilar regulations exist for insurance and other finan-
cial market participants. Following the failures of
ratings in the US sub-prime mortgage-based secu-
rities market, significant work has been under-
taken by regulators and supervisors, at the global
level and on both sides of the Atlantic, to reduce
regulatory reliance on credit ratings. The most rad-
ical initiative so far has been the decision by the
US Congress to ask federal supervisors to elimi-
nate all references to credit ratings in their rules
(Section 939A of the US Dodd-Frank Act of July
2010). However, implementing this decision is
2. See for example Moody’s
(2009) in the case of
corporate ratings.
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‘References to risk ratings in regulations are undesirable but the alternatives might be even
worse. Replacing them with references to market-based risk indicators may sharply increase
pro-cyclicality, as such indicators are typically much more volatile than credit ratings.’
proving difficult, not least because it impedes the
adoption by the US of global supervisory stan-
dards (‘Basel 2.5’ and Basel III), which do refer to
credit ratings (Westlake, 2011). At the global level,
a review of this issue by the Financial Stability
Board has concluded that “in certain cases, it may
take a number of years for market participants to
develop enhanced risk management capability so
as to enable reduced reliance on credit rating
agencies” (FSB, 2010).
One problem is that, while references to risk rat-
ings in regulations are undesirable, the alterna-
tives might be even worse. In particular, banks’
own models of risk assessment have been proven
by the crisis to be even less reliable than credit
ratings, including in the largest banks where risk
management was widely believed to be most
advanced (see for example UBS, 2008). Replac-
ing references to ratings with references to
market-based risk indicators may sharply
increase pro-cyclicality, as such indicators are
typically much more volatile than credit ratings2. 
As a consequence, it is to be expected that ratings
will be complemented with other measures of risk,
but that a complete elimination of references to
credit ratings from the European financial rule-
book would appear both impractical and undesir-
able given the lack of proper alternatives in many
cases. Moreover, contemplating such steps in the
current period of market stress may contribute to
short-term volatility.
In particular, the EU and its member states should
proceed with full implementation of the ‘Basel 2.5’
and Basel III accords, including the extent to
which these still refer to the use of credit ratings in
spite of the Basel Committee’s efforts to reduce
reliance. These efforts by the Basel Committee
and other international financial standards-set-
ters are expected to continue and to bring about
gradual improvements in the years to come.
Opting for a complete elimination of any
regulatory reference to credit ratings in the short
term would have significant downsides. 
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3. No figures are publicly
available but anecdotal evi-
dence suggests that rev-
enue generated by
sovereign ratings as a
share of the total revenue of
the leading ratings agen-
cies is no more than a few
percent at most.
3 A EUROPEAN RATINGS FOUNDATION
In a June 2011 resolution, the European Parlia-
ment asked the European Commission to study
the creation of a new fully-independent European
Credit Ratings Foundation (European Parliament,
2011). The resolution does not include an explicit
deadline for this. The Commission's proposal for a
third EU Regulation on CRAs (CRA 3) does not
retain the option of EU-level public sponsorship of
a new CRA:
“This proposal is not aimed at setting up a
European credit rating agency. As requested by
the European Parliament in its report on credit
rating agencies of 8 June 2011, this option was
assessed in detail in the impact assessment
accompanying this proposal. The impact
assessment found that even if a publicly
funded CRA may have some benefits it terms of
increasing the diversity of opinions in the rating
market and providing an alternative to the
issuer pays model, it would be difficult to
address concerns relating to conflicts of inter-
est and its credibility, especially if such CRA
would rate sovereign debt. However, these find-
ings should by no means discourage other
actors from setting up new credit rating agen-
cies. The Commission will monitor to what
extent new private entrants in the credit rating
market will provide for more diversity” (Euro-
pean Commission, 2011).
In June, the Parliament also proposed to establish
a European ratings index (EURIX), incorporating
all ratings of registered CRAs that are available on
the market (European Parliament, 2011).
While more competition in the credit ratings
market is desirable, it is not clear that this can be
achieved through a public initiative. A publicly-
sponsored ratings agency would be assumed by
market participants to be politically constrained
in its credit assessments and would therefore
struggle to make a difference in terms of market
perceptions – especially in a context in which
there is a widespread perception that EU authori-
ties are tempted to increase political leverage over
ratings decisions generally, as illustrated by the
debate on the preparation of the CRA 3 Regulation
before the publication of the European Commis-
sion’s proposal in mid-November 2011.
Incidentally, it is not clear that a specialisation in
sovereign ratings could represent a sustainable
business model for a financially independent rat-
ings agency. Sovereign ratings by the three most
established CRAs do not generate significant rev-
enue3. CRAs rate the largest sovereigns not as a
direct revenue generator, but because it is a nec-
essary building block for other, more lucrative rat-
ings segments such as those of corporate issuers.
Indeed, many sovereign ratings are unsolicited,
especially for the largest sovereign issuers, and
as a consequence they are a pure cost centre for
the CRAs. The low financial dependence on sover-
eign ratings also results in less obvious conflicts
of interest in rating sovereigns than in other seg-
ments of CRA activity.
4 ASSUMPTION OF AN EXPLICIT RATING ROLE BY
PUBLIC AUTHORITIES
If a public authority such as the ECB or the IMF
were to publish sovereign credit ratings, it is likely
that they would be considered by market
investors very differently from those assigned by
private-sector CRAs, if only because both institu-
tions are at least potentially able to directly
impact sovereign creditworthiness with their own
policy decisions, and because sovereigns partici-
pate in the governance of both institutions.
According to a report by the British House of Lords,
the IMF (or OECD) cannot avoid conflicts of inter-
ests by acting as a ratings agency because it is
involved in providing money to the EU and
because its constituencies and effective owners
are the governments themselves (House of Lords,
2011). In addition, the IMF’s or ECB’s credibility
would suffer if their ratings were perceived as
inadequate in the light of developments occuring
after their publication.
One specific issue that has been in the spotlight
in recent months is the ECB’s collateral policy,
which has required successive revisions as the
sovereign ratings of euro-area countries, in par-
ticular Greece, have been downgraded. The con-
sequence has been that the ECB’s criteria for the
acceptance of collateral have been much less
reliant on credit ratings in practice than they had
appeared to be in principle. An influential paper by
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Buiter and Sibert (2005) has even gone as far as
to argue that the ECB’s own collateral policy for its
repo operations has contributed to some of the
fiscal indiscipline observed before the crisis
because it insufficiently discriminates between
euro-area sovereign bonds.
A related issue is the risk-weighting of euro-area
sovereign debt in banks’ capital calculations, for
which the current zero risk-weighting under the
applicable Capital Requirements Directives
appears increasingly at odds with financial real-
ity. The Deputy Director-General of the Bank for
International Settlements, the Chairman of the
European Banking Authority, and the Chair of the
European Parliament’s ECON Committee have all
been reported as advocating a reexamination of
the zero risk-weighting policy (Hickley, 2011;
York, 2011). However, this specifically applies to
the euro area as a unique currency union of large
developed economies. The fundamental question
is not so much the distortions induced by the zero
risk-weighting, but the absence of an effective
risk-free asset in the euro-area financial con-
struct, which one might relate to the broader cur-
rent debate on the design flaws of the euro-area
fiscal framework. Particularly given current
market instability it may therefore be too early to
envisage a root-and-branch reform of the princi-
ples that underpin sovereign credit risk-weighting
in capital regulation, at least as long as the out-
line of the euro area’s future fiscal policy frame-
work remains undetermined (see Tett, 2011, for
a broader exposition of this argument). 
5 CONCLUSIONS
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) have not consis-
tently met the expectations placed on them by
investors and policymakers. It is difficult, however,
to improve the quality of ratings through
regulatory initiatives. In the sovereign bond
market, CRAs often follow a general deterioration
in market sentiment. At the same time, major
announcements have added to market pressure
so that a two-way causality has been established.
Ratings decisions on sovereigns have a market
impact because the financial system partly relies
on ratings for risk assessment and balance sheet
composition. However, reducing the regulatory
reliance on ratings is not an easy task. The more
fundamental questions that the euro area needs
to answer are what a safe euro-area-wide refer-
ence asset would look like, given that national
sovereign bonds are ever less able to play this
role, and how it could be constructed. 
‘Credit rating agencies have not consistently met the expectations placed on them by investors
and policymakers. Reducing the reliance in the regulatory system on ratings in the long term is
desirable. However, robust alternative assessments of risk will need to be developed.’
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